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Abstract
In NT1 and NT2 v Google and The Information Commissioner the High Court of England and Wales
considered the applicability of the right to be forgotten to cases involving “spent” criminal convictions
under the Data Protection Directive and in light of the decision of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) inGoogle Spain v AEPD. The decision represents an important development in the evolving
body precedent concerning the right to be forgotten in European law while also offering an insight into
a potential shift in attitude among common law courts towards the applicability of art.8 rights in the
context of criminal convictions.
Introduction
NT1/NT21 is perhaps the most high-profile consideration of the right to be forgotten in a common law
jurisdiction following the decision inGoogle Spain SL v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD)2
in 2014. The case, more accurately two joined cases, concerns NT1 and NT2, two businessmen previously
convicted of criminal offences. The claimants sought the removal by the defendant, Google, of search
results concerning their previous convictions on the basis that the results conveyed inaccurate, out-of-date
and irrelevant information, failed to attach sufficient public interest and/or otherwise constituted an
illegitimate interference with their right to be forgotten as established in Google Spain.
1. The right to be forgotten in Google Spain
In Google Spain the CJEU interpreted art.14 of the Data Protection Directive 19953 and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular arts 7 and 8, as including a “right to be forgotten”.
In that case a Spanish national, Mr Gonzalez, complained to the AEPD that a Google search of his name
revealed an article from Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia containing information related to the 1998
sale of his property in satisfaction of social security debts.
The AEPD upheld Costeja’s complaint and ordered Google to delist the results. On appeal before the
Spanish High Court a preliminary referral was made to the CJEU. The referral sought clarification in
relation to three questions. First, the High Court queried the application of the Directive to Google as a
US-based company. Secondly, the Court sought clarification on the “controller” status of a search engine
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under the Directive and finally whether individuals had a “right to be forgotten” by a search engine and,
if so, what the scope of such a right might be.
The CJEU found the Directive did apply to Google, and that in making the information containing
personal data available an internet service provider processed personal data and was therefore a data
controller for the purposes of art.2 the Directive.4
The Court also held a “right to be forgotten” exists under arts 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which entitles individuals to request that information no longer be made available to the general
public by means of search engine results.5 In acknowledging the right, the Court held privacy would “as
a rule” outweigh the interests of internet users in finding information, and Google’s economic interests,
but noted the right was not absolute.
As a result of Google Spain, data subjects may apply to the relevant national authority or court under
art.12(b) and/or art.14(1)(a) of the Directive to remove links to third party publications from the results
of internet search engines.6 Subsequent to the decision the art.29 Working Party issued Guidelines on the
implementation of the judgment. Part II of the Guidelines outline common criteria for handling complaints
pursuant to Google Spain, on which Warby J drew in assessing the claims of NT1 and NT2.7
2. Claims in the case
In accordance withGoogle Spain the claimants each sought delisting orders under s.14, and compensation
under s.13 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), which gives effect to the Directive.8 Additionally, the
claimants sought compensation for the tort of misuse of private information as a result of Google’s conduct
in continuing to return search results in the period following their complaints.9
Drawing on the ruling in Google Spain as well as the art.29 guidelines, Warby J identified the main
issues in NT1/NT2 as:
1. Whether the claimants were entitled to have the links complained of excluded fromGoogle’s
Search results:
a. due to contents which constituted inaccurate personal data; or
b. because the continued listing constituted an unjustified interference with the data
protection or privacy rights of the complainant.
2. If the claimants were entitled to have the links excluded, whether the claimants were entitled
to compensation for the persistence of the listing pending the judgment.10
3. NT1’s case
In the late 1980s and early 1990s NT1 was involved in a property business in connection with which he
was later convicted of a criminal conspiracy to defraud consumers and was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. NT1was also accused, but not convicted of, a separate conspiracy connected with the same
undertaking. There was contemporaneous media coverage of these and related matters, links to which
were made available by Google Search. NT1 was released on licence having served half his custodial
sentence in the early 2000s.
4Google Spain at [28], [33]-[34], [38].
5Google Spain at [94], [96].
6Google Spain at [81], [85], [94], [99].
7Google Spain at [135], [141], [159]. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the
European Union Judgment on Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) andMario Costeja Gonzalez”,
26 November 2014, at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf [Accessed 25 May
2018].
8NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [26].
9NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [42]; Campbel, McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714; [2008] QB 73.
10NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [9].
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After his conviction became spent NT1 requested that Google remove links to reports of his convictions.11
The first request to delist was submitted in June 2014 following the ruling in Google Spain and sought
the removal of six links. Google replied in October 2014 agreeing to delist one link but declining in respect
of the remaining five. NT1 requested that Google reconsider the decision, which Google declined to do.
Subsequently, NT1’s solicitors repeated the request for removal, which was again refused. Consequently,
NT1 brought suit leading to NT1/NT2.12
3.1 Abuse of process?
Warby J first considered Google’s contention that NT1’s claims were an abuse of the Court’s process as
they amounted to an illegitimate attempt to circumvent the procedural and substantive law applicable to
claims in defamation.13 Warby J dismissed this argument noting that a claimant may choose to “… rely
on any cause of action that arises or may arise from a given set of facts” without such choice being
considered an abuse.14
3.2 Google’s claim of journalistic exemption
Warby J also rejected Google’s contention that it should be permitted to avail of the journalism exemption
contained in s.32 of the DPA which provided that processing for special purposes, included journalism,
enjoyed exemptions from the provisions of the Act including s.14.15 Google contended that the processing
was undertaken with a view to publication for journalistic purposes and should therefore be exempted.
Warby J found that although he could accept that the concept of journalism was broad, the concept
was not so elastic as to embrace every activity connected to conveying information or opinions.16 Nor did
he find that he could agree with the narrower version of Google’s argument that the concept of journalism
covered services the purpose of which was to enable users to access third-party publisher content which
disclosed information, opinions and ideas. The judge noted that Google’s service was a commercial one
and that Google’s own purposes were therefore separate and distinct in nature.17
The judge noted, obiter, that Google’s argument, if accepted, would fail to meet the elements required
by s.32(1)(b) and (c) as there was no evidence that Google had given consideration to the public interest
in its continued publication of the URLs complained of at any time before NT1’s delisting request.18Warby
J thus found that the claim failed at the threshold stage and proceeded to consider the grounds on which
the claimant might assert a successful claim for delisting pursuant to Google Spain.
3.3 Could a delisting order be made?
3.3.1 Were the data accurate?
NT1 made six complaints of inaccuracy in relation to the use of particular words or phrases though no
particulars of the alleged inaccuracies were provided. This required the judge to carry out his own analysis
from which he concluded that there were three complaints about the first article complained of, five about
the second article complained of and two about a book extract.19 In assessing whether inaccuracy was
11NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [5].
12NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [6].
13NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [57], [58].
14NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [61].
15NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [95].
16NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [98].
17NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [98]-[101].
18NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [102].
19NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [79].
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indeed present, Warby J endorsed the understanding of the court in Charleston v New Group Newspapers
Ltd20 that words must be read and interpreted in context. NT1 resisted this view as imposing “artificial
restrictions” on the meaning of words or phrases used — an assertion not accepted by the Court.21
Noting the inherent difficulty in assessing the truth of statements published two decades previously,
particularly in light of the testimony of NT1 who under cross-examination tended to “evade, to exaggerate,
[and] to obfuscate”Warby J found himself unable to accept much of the claimant’s testimony and rejected
all six complaints of inaccuracy.22
3.3.2 Was there an interference with NT1’s privacy or data protection rights?
The CJEU in Google Spain made clear that where evidence exists that the availability of a search result
is causing prejudice to the claimant’s rights this would be a strong factor in favour of delisting. The
Working Party in its discussion cited an example of undue prejudice in which a foolish misdemeanor, no
longer the subject of public debate and with no wider public interest, would lead to a situation in which
the disproportionately negative impact on the privacy of the data subject would merit delisting.23
In analysing the remaining information, Warby J noted the claimant’s allegation that the continued
availability of the information had infringed his right to privacy and caused substantial damage and distress
to him as a result of his subsequent treatment as a “pariah” in his business and social life, as well as making
him the subject of threats in public places. NT1 also alleged that there had been disruption to his family
life.24
Warby J noted that while there was some information in the articles which related to the complainant’s
health, information which was prima facie private, the information was trivial, historic and made in public
in the course of proceedings such that it was not intrinsically private.25
In assessing the remainder of the claims, Warby J noted NT1’s case suffered from a lack of causation
in establishing whether the harm would have resulted irrespective of Google’s actions.26 In particular, the
judge noted that the only evidence of threats dated from incidents during NT1’s term in prison and shortly
after his release and could not be attributed to any illegitimate processing by Google.27 Equally, the judge
found he could not attribute the only specific incident recounted by NT1 in which a business deal was
hindered by the counterparty’s knowledge of his conviction to the behavior of Google as it occurred before
NT1’s conviction became spent.28
In relation to the impacts on the claimant’s family and private life, the judge noted that the claims were
little more than a reiteration of the pleaded case with no specific incidents or detail as to the nature of the
impact with the result that the evidence of harm or prejudice to NT1’s rights to privacy and data protection
was insufficient to add any great weight in favour of delisting.29
3.3.3 Balancing individual rights and the public interest
In seeking to balance NT1’s rights as against the public interest, Warby J noted that the Working Party
Guidelines identified the overall purpose of its criteria as assessing whether the information is relevant
according to the interest of the general public. The Guidelines noted that whether the claimant was still
20Charleston v New Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 65.
21NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [83], [142].
22NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [92]-[94].
23NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [147].
24NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [149].
25NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [140], [145], [146].
26NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [151].
27NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [152].
28NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [153].
29NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [154], [155].
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engaged in the same professional activity and was a public individual would be particularly relevant in
such an assessment.
Google contended that NT1’s business career since his release from prison, combined with misleading
claims made online,30 supported their contention that the information should remain available to act as
correction to the narrative promoted by the claimant.31 In response, NT1 contended that the right to receive
information is inherently less weighty than the right to impart it.32
Warby J found no support for NT1’s contention at law or in the argument presented33 and went on to
note that NT1’s post-prison career included lending money to businesses and individuals—a pursuit which
the judge found it reasonable to assume was funded by the proceeds of the fraud perpetrated on consumers
who had moved abroad prior to the claimant’s arrest and imprisonment.34 Warby J further noted that the
scale of NT1’s fraud was far from negligible and that the claimant’s portrayal of himself online and on
social media were aimed at the public and were known to be false and misleading.35
The judge then turned to examine whether, as a result of NT1’s role in public life, the information
complained of constituted genuinely private information. TheWorking Party Guidelines provide that there
will be a stronger argument against delisting where the information concerns a public figure, or an individual
playing a role in public life.36 The judge noted the Working Party’s definitions of “public figures”, which
includes individuals who have a degree of media exposure and “playing a role in public life” which the
Working Party suggests should be guided by whether the public have an interest in information which
may protect them against improper public or professional conduct.37
The judge noted that though NT1’s role in public life was no longer prominent it subsisted, in light of
which, and combined with the claimant’s misrepresentation of his reputation online, Warby J found that
NT1 was a public figure and that the Working Party Guidelines favoured the continued availability of the
information.38
3.3.4 Criminal nature of the offence
Finally, Warby J considered the criminal nature of the offence involved. The judge noted that the context
in which the information was published was that of substantially fair and accurate reporting in national
media of public legal proceedings and that such reporting was both a natural and foreseeable result of the
dishonest criminal conduct of the claimant.39
Warby J dismissed NT1’s claim that he had a legitimate expectation of rehabilitation after leaving
prison noting that, had the law remained as it stood when NT1 was released, his sentence would never
have become spent, only becoming entitled to such an expectation in 2014 following the revision of the
law.40 The issue to be addressed was therefore whether the fact that the conviction was spent was sufficiently
weighty to mandate an order for delisting.41
This section of Warby J’s consideration is perhaps where the impact of Google Spain at a national
level becomes most obvious—requiring the Court to reconcile, in light of legislation passed 25 years
before the advent of the internet, the right to rehabilitation as an aspect of the law of personal privacy with
30 Subsequent to his release and resuming his business NT1 also caused online postings to be made about his business experience and reputation
which promoted the idea of NT1 as a man of “unblemished integrity”. NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [123], [124].
31NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [117].
32NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [134].
33NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [132]-[134].
34NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [121].
35NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [130].
36NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [139]; Von Hannover v Germany (No.1) (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 1 at [63].
37NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [137].
38NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [138].
39NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [157].
40NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [158].
41NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [163].
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the competing right of the public to information.42 At the beginning of his analysis the judge returned to
first principles, noting that the starting point in the common law is that criminal proceedings are held in
public and that a person will not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to their content. The
judge went on to note that despite this there may come a time, determined by Parliament, when a conviction
becomes spent and an individual’s art.8 rights are engaged.
However, Warby J found that it did not follow from this that the individual’s art.8 rights are of
preponderant weight and observed that there is no bright line in art.8 jurisprudence on when the article
will outweigh other rights.43 The judge found that NT1’s case lay at the very outer limit of those sentences
which could become spent under the statutory scheme, and indeed would never have become spent under
the law as it stood from 1974 to 2014 in accordance with the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.44
Moreover, Warby J remarked that the comments of the sentencing judge clearly indicated the claimant’s
sentence would have been longer but for his ill-health.
Warby J concluded that NT1’s art.8 rights were not engaged due to his conduct subsequent to his
release, the nature of his offence, including the length of his sentence, and his failure to proffer detailed
evidence of the impact on his rights which was attributable to the continued availability of the search
results.45
The judge also emphasised that while it was of limited relevance to those with whomNT1 had business
dealings to learn of his conviction, there were people who had a legitimate interest in such knowledge,
still more so in circumstances where the claimant’s own postings online had misrepresented his business
record and reputation.46Warby J thus found that retention would serve the legitimate purpose of correcting
the record in circumstances where it was not clear the relevance of the information had been exhausted.47
3.4 Decision and remedies
Warby J thus dismissed NT1’s claims of inaccuracy and also dismissed the remainder of the delisting
claim on the basis that the claimant had failed to satisfy the criteria established in Google Spain. Warby
J further found that the claim for misuse of private information failed, having found Google’s processing
to be justified, and that there was thus no basis for the award of compensation.48
4. NT2’s case
In the early 2000s NT2 was involved in a firm which was subject to public campaign of opposition due
to its environmental practices. Criminal and nuisance acts were committed against the firm and NT2
received death threats. In response, the firm hired private investigators to seek to identify those responsible.
In his role within the firm NT2 authorised these investigators to use surveillance methods which he knew
to be illegal.49
NT2 pleaded guilty at an early stage and was sentenced to sixth months’ imprisonment of a potential
maximum sentence of 12 months, which was reduced in light of his guilty plea and the presence of personal
mitigating factors.50 Both the conviction and sentence were reported in national and local media. NT2
served six weeks in custody and was released in 2008. As with NT1 the conviction became “spent” but
42NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [165]-[166].
43NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [166].
44Subsequently the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) the rehabilitation period after which sentences became
spent was reduced.
45NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [167].
46NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [168].
47NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [168], [169].
48NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [56].
49NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [179]-[181].
50NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [182].
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the original news reports remained available. Unlike NT1, however, NT2’s conviction and sentence were
also mentioned in more recent publications, two of which were reports of interviews given by NT2.
NT2 requested the removal of eight links by Google in April 2015. 51 Google declined on the grounds
that the reports related “to matters of substantial public interest regarding [NT2’s] professional life”.52
NT2 subsequently issued proceedings seeking relief in respect of the eight links as well as three further
links two of which were subsequently removed voluntarily.53
At the outset Warby J noted that Google’s claims of abuse of process and journalistic exemption also
failed in respect of NT2.54
4.1 Could a delisting order be made?
4.1.1 Were the data accurate?
The claimant alleged inaccuracy in respect of one of the articles only. NT2 alleged the piece was inaccurate
as it suggested, incorrectly, that he had gained financially from his crime.55 Google accepted that the item
conveyed serious imputations against suspected criminals but argued that those portions of the piece could
not have been understood as referring to NT2.56 Warby J, however, found that the article was inaccurate
as it gave the misleading impression that the claimant’s criminality did result in financial gain, by describing
and comparing the claimant’s case to those involving instances in which individuals had received financial
gain as a result of criminal activity.57 The judge thus made the appropriate delisting order.58
4.1.2 Was there an interference with NT2’s privacy or data protection rights?
As with NT1, NT2 claimed the availability of the links complained of had resulted in a profound impact
on his business and personal life. Warby J noted that, as with NT1, much of the emphasis was on the
impact of the listings on the claimants’ business. In NT2’s case the impacts were a subsequent disadvantage
or difficulty in securing banking facilities and business opportunities. The judge noted that though the
information given exceeded that provided by NT1, the claims remained vague and lacked detail.59
4.1.3 Balancing individual rights and the public interest
In considering whether NT2 constituted a public figure, the judge found that while the complainant did
not enjoy the status as a public figure which he previously had, he remained a public figure in a reduced
but not wholly eliminated capacity.60
Warby J continued, noting that the claimant was no longer involved with the industry of which he had
been a part at the time of the crime nor had he misrepresented his reputation or history as NT1 had. Google
maintained that despite this the information in NT2’s case remained relevant and that the self-promotion
engaged in by NT2 supported the claim that the articles complained of should remain available to correct
the record.
Google drew, specifically, on two press interviews given by NT2 subsequent to his conviction becoming
spent, as well as a personal website and online news reports which promoted NT2 as a successful
51NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [7].
52NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [8].
53NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [8], [174].
54NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [177].
55NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [212], [187].
56NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [188].
57NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [190].
58NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [191].
59NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [216]-[218].
60NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [210].
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businessman with experience in finance and environmental matters. Warby J found that the interviews
indicated NT2 was not seeking to hide his crime from the public and that neither the publications nor the
interviews made claims which were inconsistent with the evidence against him or “extravagantly beyond
what might have been justified by reference to the principle of rehabilitation”.61
4.1.4 The criminal nature of the offence
The most significant point on which the cases of NT1 and NT2 differed, in the opinion of the judge, was
the nature of the criminal offences involved. As with NT1 the judge noted that the reporting at issue was
a natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of the complainant’s conviction and that, with the exception
of the article delisted for inaccuracy, the reporting was fair and accurate in the context of the remaining
publications.62
Warby J noted that while a criminal offence was at issue in both cases, distinctions were apparent
between the claimants’ cases. The first was that NT2’s conviction was always due to become spent—both
under the 1974 Act as well as following its 2014 revision with the result that NT2 had a legitimate
expectation of rehabilitation from the time of his release.63 The judge also noted that, unlike NT1, NT2
provided credible evidence in support of his case that the availability of the search results had caused
damage to his business. In a private context the judge noted that the presence of a young family in NT2’s
case strengthened his case for the existence of an interference with his art.8 rights.64
The judge also emphasised the nature of NT2’s conviction as a significant factor in deciding whether
the information had prejudiced his rights under arts 7 and 8. Warby J noted that the crime of invasion of
privacy was not a crime of dishonesty, as had been the case with NT1 and that NT2 had acted in good
faith believing his actions were necessary in light of his targeting by malign actors. The judge placed
particular emphasis on the fact that NT2 did not contest the charges, had pleaded guilty at an early stage
and showed an awareness and remorse for his crime which Warby J deemed to be genuine.65 Finally, the
judge repeatedly noted that the relevance of the crime to potential customers was “slender to non-existent”
and that there was no suggestion the wrongdoing would be repeated.66
4.2 Decision and remedies
Based on these factors Warby J noted that the information complained of had become irrelevant and of
insufficient, legitimate interest to users to justify its continued availability.67 The judge found the information
had been public at the time of publication but that that position had changed over time and that art.8 was
engaged, in particular by the presence of a young family in NT2’s life.68
While the judge noted the interference with the claimant’s art.8 rights was not grave he found the
impact on NT2’s rights was nevertheless sufficient to require justification based on relevance which
Google had been unable to provide.69
Therefore, Warby J, in addition to upholding the complaint of inaccuracy, found there had been a
misuse of private information in as much as the claimant had established a reasonable expectation of
privacy as a result of: the fact that his sentence would always have become spent; the change in the
character of the information over time; and the engagement of his art.8 rights. As a result the judge issued
61NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [205], [206].
62NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [219]-[220].
63NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [222].
64NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [221]-[222].
65NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [222].
66NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [203], [204], [222].
67NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [223].
68NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [224].
69NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [226].
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an order for delisting in respect of the remaining articles.70 However, the Court found Google had taken
reasonable care, and that as a result the claimant was not entitled to either compensation or damages.71
5. Analysis of the judgment
The decision inNT1/NT2 is particularly relevant given the traditional hostility of common law jurisdictions
to rights of privacy that extend to historical criminal convictions.72 Common law jurisdictions have
traditionally privileged principles of open justice in contrast to the approach of many civil law jurisdictions
which, in general, opposes punitive shaming and presumes criminal records to be confidential.73 The civil
law approach is reflected in the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data as well as the Data Protection Directive art.8(5) and the
General Data Protection Regulation.74
NT1/ NT2 thus represents an explicit departure from traditional common law attitudes toward criminal
histories. However, several aspects of the judgment deserve particular attention in relation to the potential
of the decision to act as a useful precedent.
The most evident issue is that the judgment has been anonymised and referred to the convictions and
circumstances of the claimants’ crimes as well as the impact on their private and family lives in a manner
sufficiently broad so as to preserve their identities. The emphasis placed by Warby J on the personal
dispositions of both claimants and the absence of detailed evidence presented in the case make this
problematic. The result is a judgment whose criteria are largely subjective, and whose findings are rendered
in broad strokes, lacking a nuanced analysis of the specific details, or levels of detail, futile to future
claimants.
In particular, the anonymisation poses challenges in distinguishing the criteria which will be considered
sufficient to trigger a “grave” interference with arts 7 and 8, though this may also be attributable to the
paucity of evidence offered by the claimants themselves. As a result of the anonymisation it is difficult
to determine accurately which, if either, is the case.
In relation to the criteria associated with a criminal offence which favour delisting, Warby J centred
his analysis on the guidelines established by the Working Party, of which the presence of criminal
convictions is an aspect. However, his judgment neglected to establish a more specific set of criteria.
Based on Warby J’s remarks, it appears that the length of the sentence and its relative placing on the
scale of offences which may become “spent” will be relevant. However, Warby J specifically noted that
a spent conviction would not be determinative and would be merely “weighty” in balancing individual
rights and the public interest. There was no clarification of whether convictions which were not, and would
not, become spent would be amenable to delisting though given the differentiation between NT1 and NT2
based in part on the severity of their sentences such convictions would implicitly not be amenable to
delisting.
The judge also referred in his decision regarding NT2 to the fact that the crime at issue was not one of
“dishonesty”. However, there was no discussion of whether the differentiation as between a crime of
dishonesty and other crimes was a determinative factor. Again, the implication from the judgment is that,
as with a spent conviction, this will be a consideration rather than determinative factor.
70NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [224]-[226].
71NT1 and NT2 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at [227], [228], [230].
72For a comparative analysis as between a common law and civil law jurisdiction see J.B. Jacobs and E. Larrauri, “Are criminal convictions a public
matter? The USA and Spain” (2012) 14(1) Punishment and Society 3. On the still recent change in the Irish position, see T.J. McIntyre, “Criminals,
Data Protection and the Right to a Second Chance” (2017) 58 The Irish Jurist 27.
73 J.B. Jacobs and E. Larrauri, “European Criminal Records & Ex-Offender Employment” New York University Public Law and Legal Theory, http:
//lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/532/ [Accessed 25 May 2018].
74Article 6 provides that criminal convictions “may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides adequate safeguards”.
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A more helpful analysis would arguably have focused solely on the public interest guaranteed by
maintaining the listings.While the judgment emphasised differential impacts on the public in its discussion
of the offences of both claimants it muddied the waters by introducing dishonesty as a factor. The result
is an unclearmélange of a public interest test with a categorical sliding scale of offences defined in relation
to their relative degrees of deception. The implication that a conviction for a violent crime committed
without deception would bemore favourably treated than a non-violent offence of dishonesty is problematic
on a public policy basis.
Moreover, as criminal acts generally involve an individual recklessly or knowingly breaking the law,
invariably in a manner which seeks to avoid detection, the merits of using honesty as a distinguishing
metric is of questionable merit.
The most substantively considered andmost portable aspect of the judgment is its treatment of self-help.
Both claimants, on the advice of reputation management professionals, had generated content with the
express aim of influencing Google’s list of returned results prior to the decision in Google Spain. In
differentiating between the legitimate self-help employed by NT2 and the misleading information
promulgated by NT1, Warby J clarified that self-help can be counted against claimants only where it is
deliberately misleading.
Conclusion
The decision in NT1/NT2 is somewhat confined to its facts due to the emphasis placed by the judge on a
subjective assessment of credibility and remorse. Despite this, the case offers a tentative first step towards
clarifying the criteria for a delisting order in cases involving criminal convictions and offers a significant
endorsement of the right to be forgotten in such cases.
The decision in relation to NT1 may be clarified on appeal. However, the trial judge’s comments on
the claimant’s credibility and the paucity of evidence offered would seem to make the likelihood of a
successful appeal remote. Furthermore, the High Court case has generated significant media attention and
an appeal to the Supreme Court would likely generate still more. In such circumstances were the reporting
restrictions to be lifted following an appeal NT1’s conviction would, somewhat ironically, be more public
than if had he chosen not to pursue a delisting, as indeed was the case with the original appellant inGoogle
Spain.
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